Reprinted in Aristotle's Ethics, edited by T. Irwin, Garland Press, 1995; revised in Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, edited by A. Rorty, University of California Press, 1996.

ONE question asked about the relationship between feelings and emotion is whether feelings are a feature necessary to constitute emotion. Answers vary from James's assertion that they are so central as to be emotion, to Bedford's and Solomon's insistence that they are irrelevant to emotion. More moderate answers, however, have emerged, views in which feelings have a place with regard to emotion--at least some of the time. Assuming that feelings do have some status with regard to emotion, a further question (...) is to be asked. When feelings are a feature relevant to emotion, what is their status with regard to the features of the complex that are said to be emotion? (shrink)

When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain. He says: λέγω δ πάθη μν τ τοιατα, θυμν όβον αδ πιθυμίαν, λως ος πεται ώς π τ πολ ασθητικ ήδον ἢ λύπη καθ' ατά. By affections I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire – in general anything which, as such, gives rise usually to perceptual pleasure and pain.

When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain. He says: λέγω δ πάθη μν τ τοιατα, θυμν όβον αδ πιθυμίαν, λως ος πεται ώς π τ πολ ασθητικ ήδον ἢ λύπη καθ' ατά. By affections I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire – in general anything which, as such, gives rise usually to perceptual pleasure and pain.